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Forward into the Past: Georgia's "New" Statutory Tort of Abusive
Litigation
Georgians can take some measure of justifiable pride in those old
Confederate legislators who, in those halcyon days over in Milledgeville
just before Longstreet gave Pickett that fateful nod, read the pulse of
their times in adopting the malice-centered Code section 2883,1 the state's
first general abusive litigation statute. Over a hundred years later, the
same sort of contemporaneous thinking characterized the 1986 Georgia
legislature's initiative in enacting O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14. Inspired by
federal court experience with amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11, this 1986 statutory experiment used objective standards to curtail
the phenomenon of abusive tactics in the courts of this state.
So what happened in 1989? Until the adoption of O.C.G.A. sections
51-7-80 to -85 ("Article 5") in the last minutes of the 1989 regular session
of the General Assembly, Georgia's statutory pattern of abusive litigation
controls formed a relatively well-balanced and cohesive, even if still
embryonic and developing, approach to the reduction of the evil it
addressed. Two legislative acts-O.C.G.A. sections 13-6-11, 9-15-14(a), and
9-15-14(b)- struck directly at the heart of abusive litigation in this state
by isolating the interests impacted by abusive court tactics and advancing
legislative responses appropriate to them.
Institutional concerns touching on the efficient and unimpeded operation
of the court system as a whole underlie the provisions of section 9-15-
14(a). The terms of that statute mandate a virtually automatic shifting
of attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation onto a party asserting
a claim or defense found to be devoid of "any justiciable issue of law or
fact." Conceptually akin to the "loser-pays-all" approach dominant in the
civil law nations of Western Europe, the fee-shifting device of section 9-
15-14(a) is objective in nature and almost administrative in application.
The "bad faith" of the abusive litigator, or his relative ability to bear
the financial burden of sanctions for his conduct, has no bearing on the
question of liability under the statutory criterion of section 9-15-14. Both
the mandatory character of the statute and its objective standard of
liability were the subjects of special attention of the Georgia Court of
Appeals in Ferguson v. City of Doraville,2 where the court applied these
features of the act with a vengeance. Whatever the substantive merits
1. The statute appears in the current Code as O.C.G.A. S 13-6-11 (Supp. 1989).
2. 186 Ga. App. 430, 367 S.E.2d 551 (1988).
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of the statute, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Ferguson provided
dramatic proof of the clarity of the policy underlying it.3
Personal misconduct, reflected in a statutory requirement for proof of
"bad faith," is the legislative target of section 13-6-11. This statute,
providing for a retrospective specific deterrence of abusive litigation
through the imposition of judicial sanction, focuses strictly on past
individual misbehavior in the prosecution of a claim or defense, or-as
the statute phrases it-where the litigant has acted in "bad faith," been
"stubbornly litigious," or caused the other party "unnecessary trouble
or expense." It subordinates and even displaces the collective concerns
which are paramount in the fee shifting technique of section 9-15-14(a).
The immediate interests addressed in section 13-6-11 are the party's
"good faith" or "bad faith," his "ill will" or "reckless and wanton
disregard" of the consequences of positions taken in litigation.
The narrow intent of section 13-6-11 is not, as it is with fee shifting,
necessarily to improve the administration of justice in the courts or to
discourage similar future behavior on the part of other litigants. The
purpose of the law is, baldly stated, to punish.
4
First adopted in 1863 and carried forward through successive codes
into the modern era, section 13-6-11 has been amended only once in
order to eliminate its original restriction to contract cases.5 Judicial
decisions have liberalized its usefulness in other respects.8 Even in the
face of the narrow constraints on section 13-6-11 as originally enrolled,
it has never been the source of significant policy confusion in this state.
General deterrence is, though weakly stated in its language, the major
policy thrust of section 9-15-14(b). Where specific deterrent statutes like
section 13-6-11 are past-oriented in their punishment of prior misconduct,
general deterrent laws like section 9-15-14(b) are more directly concerned
with the discouragement of similar behavior by others in the future.
Ideally then, laws aimed at general deterrence should address the
habitual residents of the courthouse-the plaintiffs' and defense bar-
and not their transient, sojourning clients. Section 9-15-14(b) makes a
good beginning in this direction by providing sanctions for peculiarly
lawyer-oriented forms of misbehavior: maintaining claims or defenses
lacking "substantial justification"; interposing claims or defenses for
3. Ferguson v. City of Doraville, 186 Ga. App. at 437, S.E.2d at 557. The court in
Ferguson notes that "good faith in a subjective sense" was no defense to a claim asserted
under section 9-15-14. Id. at 437, 367 S.E.2d at 557.
4. Ballenger Corp. v. Dresco Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 156 Ga. App. 425, 274
S.E.2d 786 (1980).
5. See 1984 Ga. Laws 22.
6. See Ballenger Corp. v. Dresco Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 156 Ga. App. 425,
274 S.E.2d 786 (1980) (even though the terms of section 13-6-11 limit it to use by plaintiffs,
it is nevertheless available in some situations to defendants in counterclaims); Derrickson
v. Kristal, 148 Ga. App. 320, 251 S.E.2d 170 (1978) (despite the section's reference to the
imposition of its sanctions by a jury, the judge may award them in a bench trial).
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purposes of delay or harassment; or unnecessarily expanding litigation
by other "misconduct," such as abuse of discovery procedures.
A major weakness of section 9-15-14(b) lies in the absence from its
terms of any professionally related sanctions such as reprimand,
suspension, or disbarment. 7 Despite this flaw, the general deterrent
intent behind section 9-15-14(b) remains clear.
However imperfectly, however tentatively, the amalgam of sections
13-6-11, 9-15-14(a), and 9-15-14(b) equipped this state with a spectrum of
remedial law, forming the nucleus of a balanced policy arsenal with
which to combat abusive litigation in the courts of Georgia. The
introduction of the new statutory tort of abusive litigation at the end
of the 1989 legislative session, however, raises profound questions as to
the clarity of Georgia's policy toward misconduct in her courts.8 Article
5 recasts the entire body of pre-existing abusive litigation law in Georgia
into one primarily committed to the achievement of but a single,
predominant policy objective-that of specific deterrence and specific
deterrence only.
If we learned anything on the long trail that led from the 1863 adoption
of section 13-6-11 to the enactment of section 9-15-14 in 1986, it was the
futility of attempting to realize broad, expansive social and policy goals
by means of statutory tools designed only to punish individual wrongdoers.
The 1986 legislation enacting section 9-15-14 achieved significant change
in the Georgia law of abusive litigation. This abrupt redirection of our
law rejected personal fault, evidenced by bad faith and malice, as the
sole conceptual bedrock of remedies for the reduction of abusive litigation.
Article 5 does not advance this progression. It returns us to a more
primitive stage in the evolution of our law in this critical field, the one
which was the predominant policy objective in 1863 with the adoption
of section 13-6-11.
Every recovery under the 1989 statute is expressly conditioned upon
a showing of personal malice of the offending party.9 The requirements
of the new law have disastrous implications for the goals of general
deterrence and fee-shifting as means of improvement in the judicial
system as a whole and the trial bar in particular. Compounding this
policy fracture, however, is the statute's illogical juxtaposition of malice,
arguably the most blatantly subjective standard known to the law, with
another, "without substantial justification," 10 which has its historical
origins and policy roots in the objective standards of both section 9-15-
14(b) and its model, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. This legislative
fusion of subjective and objective liability criteria serves only to muddy
7. Significantly, Federal Rule 11 has spawned a host of such lawyer-oriented
punishments. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988).
8. See O.C.G.A. SS 51-7-80 to -85 (Supp. 1989).
9. O.C.G.A. S 51-7-81(l) (Supp. 1989).
10. See 0.C.G.A. S 51-7-81(2) (Supp. 1989).
1989]
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the policy goals served by the legislation and makes uncertain the future
application of the 1989 Act in the hands of the courts of this state.
The new statutory tort is not intended to attain, nor does it foster
collaterally or incidentally, the broad social goals of a fee-shifting statute.
By requiring a separate trial for enumerated forms of misconduct, it is
at total odds with the non-judgmental, administrative nature of a true
fee-shifting statute.
Nor is the statute well-calculated to achieve the ends of an effective
general deterrent. Its definitional provisions and operative conditions of
liability make no pretense at distinguishing between lawyer and lay
person. It applies to both a rigid criterion of liability- the malice branch -
which will, in all but the most unusual of cases, be found to exist only
in the client. Moreover, the statute makes no effort to fashion any
penalties having special meaning to the lawyer, imposing penalties on
both the lawyer and the lay person without distinction."
In its upcoming 1990 session, the General Assembly would do well to
rethink its current position regarding statutory resolutions to the problem
of abusive litigation in Georgia. Section 13-6-11 should be strengthened
and made the primary statutory vehicle under Georgia law to accomplish
the specific deterrence of abusive litigation. Its malice standard should
be preserved and case law modifications to the statute which have, over
time, extended the statute beyond its original statutory confines should
be incorporated into the section.
Access to the revised section should be available to plaintiffs and
defendants equally, without recourse to the irksome counterclaim now
required of defendants by judicial decision.' 2 An amendment to the 1989
Act should specifically empower the court to make an award under its
provisions without the intervention of a jury. The legislature should
make certain through explicit language that section 13-6-11 is available
in all civil actions. Most significantly, the section should be amended to
allow specifically the recovery of attorney's fees and costs under its
provisions and, because general tort damages are most appropriate as
a response to individual, personal misconduct, the section should permit
recovery of these damages as well.
The fee-shifting attributes of section 9-15-14(a) should be legislatively
reinforced to capitalize on the broader, societal benefits available in this
approach to the reduction of abusive litigation. The legislature should
underscore the mandatory nature of an award under the statute by
making clear that trial judges must, as a matter of normal course,
transfer fees, expenses, and costs of litigation to a litigant whenever
the statutory standard of liability is met. The standard itself, the
complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact, should be
11. See O.C.G.A. SS 51-7-81, -83 (Supp. 1989).
12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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legislatively purged of any lingering suggestion of fault or personal
culpability as an element of its composition. This change would ensure
that the judiciary will apply the standard as the objective yardstick that
it is intended to be.
The single greatest deficiency of section 9-15-14(b) as a general
deterrence against abusive litigation is the manner in which the statute
extends its reach to include lawyers and professional kinds of misconduct
peculiar to litigation and trial tactics. The overall efficiency of the code
section in responding to lawyer misbehavior in this regard could be
enhanced by focusing the authority of the trial courts on offending
attorneys.
The amendment should make clear that trial lawyers bear a unique
and special burden in the elimination of abusive litigation. This message
is not now emphatically apparent in any Georgia abusive litigation
statute. The current language of section 9-15-14(b) suggests that lawyers
and nonlawyers alike share an equal risk of penalty flowing from the
commission of the same sorts of misconduct. The legislature should
underscore the potential liability of lawyers for indulgence in abusive
tactics by making attorneys the subject of special sanctions. These
sanctions should be separate from the general provisions of the 1989
Act.
The present language of the Act, which lumps lawyers and litigants
together and tars them with the same brush, has the inevitable effect
of diminishing the attorney's special sense of responsibility for the proper
conduct of civil litigation, as well as the immediacy of the liability
potential which abuse of litigation should entail. The present terms of
section 9-15-14(b) make a start in this regard by pointing specifically to
discovery abuse as the kind of misbehavior that falls under the ban of
the section. The legislature would do well to consider the extension of
this statutory prohibition to improper or negligent document certification,
somewhat along the lines of amended Federal Rule 11.
Expansion of the bar's awareness of potential penalties for abusive
conduct in litigation would also be advanced through a legislative
enumeration of sanctions especially imposable on members of the bar.
These must be keyed to their professional standing as attorneys and
officers of the court and their relationship to the legal profession.
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